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PRESENCE AND THE FUTURE TENSE IN HORACE’S ODES* 
 
 
Abstract: Horace is sometimes said to profess in the Odes a “poetics of presence,” a philosophical 
or aesthetic orientation that privileges the here and now. This article examines how such an 
orientation toward the present might interact with the poet’s use of the future tense and especially 
with those future verbs that seem to postpone focal events. It is concluded that the Odes’ many 
gestures toward the future, from simple imperatives to the postponement of entire symposia, serve 
to problematize presence and to dramatize, in concert with other features of the collection, the 
anxious feeling that time is moving too quickly. 
 
 
hat is a Horatian ode?” wondered Heinze in his seminal essay Die 
Horazische Ode. He concluded, famously, that a Horatian ode is “an 
address to a person thought of as present.”1 In the century since this 
influential work appeared, presence in its various forms has been a central issue in 
the study of Horace’s lyric poetry, frequently discussed and sometimes 
passionately contested, yet Heinze’s thesis stills beguiles with its intuitive 
simplicity: if the Odes, as is generally believed, praise and affirm the bounty of the 
present moment, why should the poet not strive to create and represent presence 
in the scene and setting of individual poems? On the other hand, presence of this 
most evident sort is, as subsequent scholars have shown, in fact quite elusive, and 
the temporality of the Odes is complicated by a number of factors, most notably 
the poet’s frequent gestures toward the future. The goal of this article is, first of all, 
to explore how the definition of lyric presence has evolved and gained complexity 
in critical discourse on the Odes since Heinze; secondly, to examine how address, 
 
* For their assistance with this project at various stages and for their generous support of my 
work on the Odes in general, I owe an incalculable debt of gratitude to Jenny Strauss Clay, A.J. 
Woodman, John Miller and David Kovacs, eminent and devoted Horatians; I am also grateful to 
Coulter George for enlightening me on the subtleties of Indo-European linguistics, to audience 
members at CAMWS in Oklahoma City for entertaining an earlier version of this paper and to the 
anonymous readers of CJ for their constructive remarks. All errors remain my own. 
1 Heinze (1923) 160: “Die horazische Ode ist, wie wir sahen, Ansprache an eine als gegenwärtig 
gedachte Person.” Heinze’s essay was reprinted in 1938 in a book of collected essays, Vom Geist des 
Römertums; an English translation appears in Lowrie (2009a) 11–32.  
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directive expressions and verbs in the future tense accord with the “poetics of 
presence;” and, finally, to determine the aesthetic and philosophical implications 
of futurity in Horatian lyric. It will be argued that the poet, particularly in the 
sympotic poems, deploys directives and verbs in the future tense to problematize 
rather than affirm presence and to dramatize rather than compass the fleeting 
and continuous nature of time. 
For Heinze, of course, presence is straightforwardly dramatic—he imagines 
each ode sung or spoken before an explicit or implicit addressee in a notional 
space. Heinze adjusts his interpretations of individual odes to fit his model in 
clever but occasionally procrustean ways: he speculates, for instance, that 1.17 
need not be an invitation, but could be sung to Tyndaris as she arrives in the 
country, or that 3.29, which likewise appears to invite the addressee to Tibur, 
could be sung by the poet on a visit to Maecenas in Rome.2 Such strained 
readings vividly demonstrate a difficult fact about the Ηoratian ode as Heinze 
defines it: it is rarely self evident that, first of all, the addressee must be thought of 
as present and, secondly, that the utterance of the poem must be located in a 
specific situation or scene. As Citroni, one of Heinze’s many critics, has pointed 
out, truly unambiguous dramatic presence is extremely rare in the Odes; only 
occasionally are there clear and unmistakable markers of ongoing action (as in 
1.27, where the speaker reacts to a drunken brawl erupting around him), or deixis 
through demonstrative pronouns pointing to something seen by both the 
speaker and the addressee.3 Only five examples of the latter may be cited (huc 
2.3.13, hac…pinu 2.11.13–14, harum arborum 2.14.22, non hoc semper erit liminis 
aut aquae / caelestis patiens latus 3.10.19–20, hic paries 3.26.6), of which Barchiesi 
in his discussion of the issue admits only the second and the third.4 Address, on 
the other hand, is “ubiquitous.”5 The reader who attends to such details is 
 
2 Heinze (1923) 155. Fraenkel (1957) 227 n. 1 calls this particular interpretation “an 
unmistakable product of Systemszwang [the tendency to systematize].”  
3 Cf. Citroni (1995) 274–5. Citroni’s focus, however, is not really the same as Heinze’s; while 
Heinze discusses primarily the formal aspects of address, Citroni is interested in the broader notion 
of “literary communication.” Cf. Citroni (1995) 273: “Né gli oggetti né gli dèi possono essere 
destinatari di una comunicazione letteraria, mentre un personaggio pùo essere proposto dal testo 
come destinatario privilegiato di un carme anche se il carme non parla di lui in seconda persona, ma 
ne parla in terza persona o comunque lo coinvolge, anche indirettamente.” 
4 Barchiesi (2007) 156 does not discuss the other three examples, but presumably he considers 
them to be merely “‘bland’ deictic pointers.”  
5 Cf. Barchiesi (2007) 156. Statistics bear this out: only six poems, out of eighty-eight in Odes 1–
3, lack a named or anonymous addressee: 1.34, 1.36, 2.15, 3.2, 3.5 and 3.9. Unusual circumstances 
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frequently marooned at a middle point: he can conceive, as Heinze insists he 
conceive, of a situation of discourse in which the speaker of the poem hails an 
addressee who stands in the speaker’s presence, yet only occasionally is such a 
conception the inevitable or even the most plausible reading of the poem. 
So Heinze’s notion of dramatic presence can only by tendentious means be 
made to fit Horace’s lyric poetry; indeed, the conceptual space of a Horatian ode 
is often, as Citroni and Barchiesi show, vaguely defined and even deemphasized. 
The contours of the dramatic situation are, in most cases, indefinite and open to 
question. But presence does not thereby disappear entirely. Most subsequent 
discussions of Horatian lyric, even those which explicitly disagree with Heinze, 
tend to define the Horatian ode as the dramatization of a discrete and focal 
present moment, whether this moment resides in a narrative sequence or recurs 
as an iterative abstraction of the lyric voice, harbinger of poetic immortality.6 
Quinn, a vociferous critic of Heinze’s approach, prefers the term “dramatic 
monologue,” which deemphasizes the direct interaction between speaker and 
addressee, but retains the idea that each ode has an implicit scene or setting 
whose contours the reader is tasked to reconstruct.7 Such an understanding of 
Horace is characteristic of the New Criticism, which typically figures a lyric poem 
as “an utterance overheard” and consequently enjoins the reader to reconstruct 
not only the dramatic situation but also the attitudes and concerns of the 
speaker.8 Thus Johnson suggests that every lyric poem enacts a present moment 
which the reader must perforce narrate and recover.9 Some odes, defined by 
                                                                                                     
explain most of these exceptional cases. 1.34 may anticipate the address of Fortuna at 1.35.1; the 
mention of Numida at 1.36.3 potentially suggests a “shadow addressee” for this poem. 3.2 and 3.5, 
as two of the Roman odes, seem to partake of the invocation in the first stanza of 3.1 of an audience 
of boys and girls (favete linguis…virginibus puerisque canto 3.1.2–4). 3.9 follows different 
conventions, being a dialogue between two characters, and the lack of direct address does not lead 
to any confusion as to who is speaking to whom. In truth, it is only 2.15 that stands out as being a 
truly “monologic” utterance which is not addressed to anyone in particular. 
6 The idea that modern lyric belongs especially to the present time may be influential here; cf. e.g. 
Culler (2002) 152: “Proverbial definition calls the lyric a monument to immediacy.” Genette 
(1992) 46–8 lists six literary critics from the 19th and 20th century (Schelling, Jean Paul, Hegel, 
Vischer, Erskine and Jakobson) who connect the genre of lyric with the present time. 
7 Cf. Quinn (1963) 87. 
8 The idea that lyric poetry is “overheard” is usually ascribed to John Stuart Mill; cf. Culler 
(2002) 137. Culler (1985) 38 argues that imagining or reconstructing this context for the lyric 
utterance “is, roughly, the approach to the lyric expounded and exemplified by the New Criticism.” 
9 Johnson (1982) 35: “behind every lyric, sometimes vaguely sketched, sometimes clearly 
defined, is a story that explains the present moment of discourse.”  
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Quinn as “verse epistles,” may not indicate this present moment with any evident 
spatial or scenic markers, but even such poems offer a focal present around which 
the reader may construct a story: spatial presence merely gives way to presence in 
a linear sequence of events.10 In other words, “here” in poetic space gives way to 
“now” in narrative time.11 
The shortcomings of this theory of lyric have been amply demonstrated by 
Culler in his essay “Apostrophe,” which pointedly opposes apostrophic lyric to 
narrative and calls into question the New Critical practice of placing lyric poems 
on a narrative continuum.12 This does not mean, however, that lyric lacks a focal 
present, but merely that its present cannot be narrated: the lyrical and 
apostrophic present is “timeless” because it resists the confines of temporal 
sequence. Fittingly, and sometimes explicitly under the influence of Culler’s 
argument, more recent scholarship on Horatian lyric often takes it as a goal to 
seek for presence a still more supple definition, a definition expansive enough to 
embrace the so-called “temporality” of writing, “a special temporality which is the 
set of all moments at which writing can say ‘now.’”13 Davis, for instance, 
emphatically rejects the idea that “unity of place is, or should be, the organizing 
principle of a Horatian ode.”14 In the case of the endlessly disputed setting of 
Odes 1.9, for example, he allows for an “expanded time frame,” an inclusive “now,” 
which encompasses not only the “time of speaking” but also the time of one’s 
youth, or perhaps any time before death (153). Yet the injunction to enjoy the 
present, far from being marginalized, is in fact rescued, in Davis’ words, from 
“trivialization” by an appreciation of its “symbolic dimensions” (145). The 
present remains central to Horace’s “ethos” of conviviality; as Davis writes, “the 
sapiens, by fully accepting his own irreversibility, undertakes to defy time by a 
 
10 Cf. Quinn (1963) 86–7. 
11 The fact that adverbial hic, like English ‘here’, can “indicate both discursive and physical 
locations” (Lowrie (2006) 117) already points to the potential blurring of spatial and narrative 
presence in lyric poetry. 
12 Cf. Culler (2002) 148–9 (originally published in 1983, but reprinted in 2002 with a new 
introduction.): “if one brings together in a poem a boy, some birds, a few blessed creatures, and 
some mountains, meadows, hills and groves, one tends to place them in a narrative where one thing 
leads to another; the events which form ask to be temporally located…But if one puts into a poem 
thou shepherd boy, ye blessed creatures, ye birds, they are immediately associated with what might be 
called a timeless present but is better seen as a temporality of writing…So located by apostrophes, 
birds, creatures, boys etc. resist being organized into events that can be narrated…”  
13 Cf. Culler (2002) 149. 
14 Cf. Davis (1991) 152. 
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gesture that valorizes the present at the expense of both past and future” (245). 
The poetic present, inexplicable in terms of physical space and linear time, may, 
in Davis’ view, be preserved as an abstraction and a symbol. 
Lowrie takes a similarly expansive view of presence in the Odes. She states 
plainly her premise that “lyric time is the hic et nunc.”15 This is indeed a complex 
hic et nunc: it involves the past and the future and moves to replace the author’s 
temporal presence with the iterative and immortal presence of the abstract 
reader. Nonetheless “Horace's now” remains the “pivot” of the poem, because 
“the rhetorical construction of Horatian lyric privileges the present moment.”16 
Not without success, either, as the poet seems to achieve, through writing, “the 
eternal recreation of the presence of song” (70). Mindt echoes Lowrie’s approach 
in her recent book Die meta-sympotischen Oden und Epoden des Horaz: the fact that 
the past and the future are entangled in the present, or that the persona loquens 
speaks to the reader as well as to the addressee, complicates, but does not in the 
end overshadow sympotic poetry’s expression of presence, emblem of a “Poetik 
des Augenblicks.”17 
The strong and often critical reaction to Heinze’s definition of the Horatian 
ode, in other words, has not succeeded in displacing presence from its central 
position in the interpretation of the Odes; scholarly discourse has rather, even as it 
dismisses the interpretive importance of the addressee’s presence before the 
singer in space, given greater emphasis to presence in time, first defining each ode 
as a discrete moment in a narrative sequence, then seeking to identify a “timeless” 
present that defies the cruel linear progression of narrative. The territory 
encompassed by “here and now” has naturally expanded apace. Davis employs 
the term “scaffolding” to explain how an ode may grow beyond a dramatic 
occasion yet still embrace an inclusive “now;” Lowrie posits that an “ever-
recurring present” is enshrined in the text by the rhetorical pose of the speaker, 
 
15 Cf. Lowrie (1997) 49. 
16 Lowrie (1997) 50 and 57–8; cf. also Lowrie (2009b) 7, where the “aesthetics of presence,” 
which identifies song with presence and writing with absence, is defined as “a mystificatory 
valuation of plenitude in language and the assignment to writing of an irreparable break between 
composition and reception.”  
17 Mindt (2007) 81:” “Schon das sympotische Bild allein also bringt Gegenwart zum Ausdruck, 
die gesamte sympotische Situation und die Worte ergänzen sich. Eine reine carpe-diem-Lyrik ohne 
einen konkreten Kontext wäre nur halb so wirksam.” In a subsequent discussion of “Gegenwart, 
Vergangenheit und Zukunft” (81–4), she identifies the symposium, both poetic and actual, as a 
connecting moment, “verbindendes Moment” (84), a way to integrate past and future into the 
present. 
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granting the poet’s wish for poetic immortality. Neither scholar adheres to 
Heinze’s strict understanding of notional poetic space, but both desire, as the 
New Critics did, to fix the Horatian ode in the present, or rather to accommodate 
the present to the Horatian ode.18  
In sum, scholars of Horatian lyric today tend to rehabilitate rather than reject 
Heinze’s definition, to loosen Heinze’s rigid principles and finesse his 
straightforward definitions. This tendency points to an abiding desire to capture 
within a broad conceptual framework some of the collection’s most striking 
features: the poet’s carefully observed pretense of orality, his repeated 
exhortation to enjoy what is at hand, and his stated desire to gain immortality 
through song. But Davis’ and Lowrie’s abstractions are nonetheless born of a 
contradiction. In what sense can the present, the very epitome of the limited and 
circumscribed, recur or expand without losing its defining singularity? Or, 
conversely, how can an abstract nunc and a diffuse hic ever truly constitute or 
capture the fluttering and evanescent moment? The ghostly “temporality of 
writing” is in one sense, as epitaphs occasionally warn, a cruel fate: you too, O 
reader, may soon find your existence reduced to this mere “framework of words,” 
life’s insubstantial shadow.19 If such a threat feels vital, we may posit that when a 
point in time and space grows and so gains immortality, it loses something of its 
essential fragility, something of its beauty and perhaps even something of its 
desirability. The present in this truest sense does not seem portable or repeatable, 
but practically invisible and difficult to grasp. Or perhaps impossible to grasp, as 
Derrida and others have argued: what, after all, is the present but traces of the 
past, forever waiting to be actualized in the ever-retreating future?20  
 
18 For a similar abstraction, cf. Edmunds (2001) 93: “the reader does not have to imagine the 
addressee as present; it is enough if the addressee is present in the conception of the speaker.” 
19 Cf. Frye (1985) 32–3 on the epitaph: “the reader is assumed to be a traveler, pursuing his 
normal course through time and space, who is suddenly confronted with something he should stop 
and read. What he reads is the verbal essence of a life which has once had its own context in space 
and time but is now enclosed in a framework of words. He is often told, at the end, that he has been 
looking in a mirror: his own context is still in ordinary space and time, but it will eventually 
disappear, and the verbal essence of his life may make an equally short poem.” This is seldom the 
explicit approach of the epitaphs in AP Book 7, but cf. AP 7.32, where a poet warns passersby of his 
own sad and empty fate—he still sings from the tomb, but can no longer take his own advice: 
Πολλάκι μὲν τόδ᾽ ἄεισα, καὶ ἐκ τύμβου δὲ βοήσω· / “Πίνετε, πρὶν ταύτην ἀμφιβάλησθε κόνιν.” (“Often 
I sang this, but I will cry out even from the tomb: ‘Drink, before you embrace this dust.’ ”) 
20 Lowrie (1997) 49–50 entertains the idea; cf. Derrida (1973) 64–5, 103. Similar ideas are 
found in Heidegger, e.g. (1996) 321: “The future is not later than the having-been and the having-
been is not earlier than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future that makes present, in 
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The contradiction is played out in an especially vivid and concrete way in the 
sympotic poems, on which Mindt focuses and to which Davis devotes a chapter. 
Such poems would seem, as a genre, to be occasional, to necessitate a certain 
discursive place and time—a pleasant room or a shady spot, with wine and other 
accoutrements close at hand. Yet in poem after poem, as is his general practice 
throughout the Odes, Horace is vague about setting and parsimonious with 
contextual markers that might define explicitly a notional sympotic space, often 
introducing what seem to be deliberate ambiguities.21 The elegant uncertainty of 
these poems, however contrary to generic expectations, is especially reflected in 
their frequent commands and directive expressions, which are sufficiently 
ubiquitous throughout the Odes as to be considered practically characteristic of 
the poet’s technique.22 Such expressions offer opposing semantic possibilities. 
On the one hand, directives may pose as speech, imply immediacy and insist 
upon the addressee’s presence, perhaps dramatic, perhaps merely attentive in 
some other way to a pressing present concern. On the other hand, they also look 
toward the future and suggest implicitly that the present will find its true 
fulfillment only there.  
This dual temporality did not escape Heinze’s notice: he imagined the speaker 
of the Odes as physically present before the addressee, but looking toward the 
future.23 A similar idea was previously expressed by the Victorian critic E.S. 
                                                                                                     
the process of having been.” Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence, which imagines a present 
bound up with the future (Also sprach Zarathustra, “Vom Gesicht und Räthsel” 2: “Und sind nicht 
solchermaassen fest alle Dinge verknotet, dass dieser Augenblick alle kommenden Dinge nach sich 
zieht? Also—sich selber noch?”), also anticipates this deconstruction of the present. 
21 For the general point, cf. pp. 2–3 above. Much of the scholarly literature that has arisen around 
Horace’s most celebrated sympotic poems demonstrates just how fraught the question of setting is. 
Is Plancus in 1.7 in Tibur or abroad (cf. n. 33 below)? Is Thaliarchus in 1.9 at Rome (Fraenkel 
(1957) 176 entertains the thought) or at some villa closer to Mt. Soracte (cf. West (1967) 3–6 and 
Syndikus (1972) 117 n. 22)? Is the season fall (Clay (1989)) or winter (Pöschl (1991) 43–4)? Is 
Maecenas in 1.20 already in the speaker’s presence or is the poem an invitation (cf. n. 34 below)? 
Do poems such as 1.4 and 2.14, which have sympotic elements but do not exhort drinking directly, 
imply an unspoken displeasure with the host’s generosity (cf. n. 35 below)?  
22 Cf. Heinze (1923) 160–2; Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) xxiv–v (“he does not meditate or 
introspect, but exhorts, questions, invites, consoles, prays, and orders…As Horace’s odes profess to 
be directed at somebody, they naturally use the techniques of rhetoric.”); Barchiesi (2007) 150–1 
(“Lyric is poetry that says ‘O’…The prevalent modes of discourse associated with [Horace’s] lyric 
are admonition, persuasion, greeting, farewell, praise and consolation: they all have some 
relationship to address and are different from soliloquy or epic narrative.”). 
23 Heinze (1923) 161: “Aus dem allen ergibt sich, daß der Blick des Lyrikers Horaz stets in die 
Zukunft gerichtet ist; äußerlich tut sich das schon darin kund, daß das Gedicht so überhäufig mit 
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Dallas, who alone among Genette’s list of critics identifies lyric not with the 
present but with the future:24 
 
The lyric is an aspiration; its banner has the strange device, Excelsior. It is a prayer for 
good to come, while it is seen afar like a ship seen by a castaway; or it is the praise of good 
enjoyed with the assurance that it will last and grow better still; or it is a lament for good 
flown, with the hope that it may soon return, as birds return in the summer.  
 
As Heinze and others emphasize, the speaker of a Horatian ode does not 
merely address, but rather prays, exhorts, consoles, advises or announces a 
decision—directive expressions that go hand in hand with aspiration. Dallas 
entertains three possible aspirations: hope for the future, hope that the present 
may continue into the future, and hope that the past will return in the future. Of 
these three, the most intriguing is the second: for here Dallas suggests that even 
hope grounded firmly in the present retains its orientation toward the time to 
come. That the speaker of the Odes on numerous occasions explicitly directs his 
addressees to privilege the present moment would seem to validate the hoary and 
imposing critical tradition that assigns the genre of lyric to the present time. Yet 
the present is only one side of the coin: the same acts of direction, as Dallas and 
Heinze show, look also toward the future. If Horace deliberately emphasizes such 
multivalent expressions to hint at presence and setting while maintaining 
ambiguity of time and place, he would seem to do two contradictory things at 
once: call attention to the present and illustrate the difficulty of embracing or 
even identifying it.25 If we, conversely, allow such a fragile and fleeting hic et nunc 
to be abstracted, iterated and expanded, we risk thereby obscuring a crucial 
nuance of the Odes’ complex temporality. 
The clearest and simplest way to measure the futurity of the Odes is to examine 
finite verbs in the future tense, of which there are 180 in the first three books 
                                                                                                     
Imperativ, Konjunctiv der Aufforderung, Futurum beginnt oder schließt.”  
24 Dallas (1852) 150. The other critics listed by Genette (cf. n. 6 above) associate lyric with the 
present, except Staiger, who locates lyric in the past. 
25 Compare Culler (2002) 154 on the apostrophe in Keats’ “This Living Hand”: “The poem 
baldly asserts what is false: that a living hand, warm and capable, is being held towards us, that we 
can see it … [the poem] knows its apostrophic time and the indirectly invoked presence to be a 
fiction and says so but enforces it as event.” Culler brilliantly captures the paradox of the 
apostrophic gesture, but ultimately takes the optimistic view that apostrophe makes presence 
happen. 
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alone by my accounting.26 Careful analysis of these instances in fact reveals a 
number of subtleties especially vulnerable to loss by assimilation into an 
expanded and redefined present. In many cases the future tense is occasioned by 
caution or gentility, as a politic or polite gesture, and a sizable minority of futures 
explicitly anticipate or defer to the future an event or action that could plausibly 
be ongoing. This orientation certainly has significant implications for the 
interpretation of Horace’s political and amatory poetry—some of which have 
been previously recognized by scholars—but it is probably most relevant to the 
evolving critical discourse on the sympotic poems, since this group of odes is 
most closely associated with the “poetics of presence.”27 In these poems, futures 
are often employed to anticipate or defer focal sympotic events, thereby 
transforming lyrical aspiration into anxiety about the nature of time. It will be 
convenient for our purposes to separate finite futures into two rough categories 
according to their use: those which suggest an order or express a decision (modal 
or voluntative futures), and those which predict an event or anticipate an 
outcome (factual futures).28 
 
26 This number is by necessity inexact: I include, for instance, dicam of 1.12.13, taking it to be 
future rather than deliberative subjunctive, but do not count the emendation occupabit (for 
occupavit of the manuscripts) at 1.12.19, which was offered by Stephanus and printed by Shackleton 
Bailey. Furthermore, variations of tense are common in the manuscript tradition: e.g inseris for 
inseres at 1.1.35, dicit for dicet 1.7.9, sumes for sumis at 1.12.2, recinit for recinet at 1.12.3, neglegit for 
negleget at 3.21.10 etc. I omit future perfects because, as a related but separate tense, they may well 
belong in a separate category; I also omit future infinitives and future participles because their 
temporal qualities are related but arguably different. In the fourth book of Odes, published after an 
interval of ten years, the poet addresses Augustus directly (cf. Lowrie (2007) 86), speaks of his 
poetry as written (meis…chartis 4.9.30–31) and in general departs from many of formal pretenses 
of the first collection (cf. Heinze (1923) 167–8). These new stylistic tendencies certainly merit 
further study. Nonetheless, as my goal is to explore a discrete corpus of examples in order to 
establish a basic understanding of the Odes’ futurity, I have chosen to limit the scope of this article to 
simple futures in the first collection. 
27 Ancona (1994), for instance, studies the speaker’s attitude toward time in the amatory odes; 
on 2.5, she writes that the lover’s attempt to control his beloved’s temporality fails precisely because 
of “the pressing movement toward the future” and “postponement of fulfilled desire;” such futurity 
“places the beloved in a realm that defeats the would-be lover's own attempt to control time” (35–
6). 
28 These categories, it must be noted, do not define a verb’s exclusive meaning or use; uses of the 
future exist on a continuum from strong expressions of will to impartial predictions of expected 
results. The purpose of categorization here is not to narrow the interpretation of specific examples, 
to obscure nuance or multiplicity of meaning; the goal is rather to tease out through a close 
examination of individual cases the various possibilities of the future tense and to examine how this 
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Quite a few future verbs appear to act as directives, to imply commands or 
announce decisions. Roughly 20% of future verbs in Odes 1–3 may be thus 
classified (cf. Appendix 1A below). This modal force of the future tense is a 
reminder of the evolution of the Latin factual future from the Proto-Indo-
European subjunctive and is also familiar from English—e.g. “you will read this 
article.”29 Most direct and closest to these origins are those instances in which a 
first person future verb announces a decision taken by the speaker of the poem: 
at 1.18.12–13, for instance, the speaker declares “I will not shake you unwilling, 
brilliant Bassareus” (non ego te, candide Bassareu / invitum quatiam), imposing his 
will upon his own actions much as an imperative attempts to influence through 
the imposition of will the actions of another. Sometimes such forms distinguish 
themselves from speech acts in the present tense (e.g. “I do”) by emphasizing a 
contrast or a change of heart: thus when the speaker says at 1.26.1–3 “I will hand 
over sorrow and fear for the violent winds to carry into the Cretan Sea” (tristitiam 
et metus / tradam protervis in mare Creticum / portare ventis), he perhaps implies a 
present state of fearful melancholy he intends to leave behind; so too when he 
threatens that he will not drink unless he hears what lover Megylla’s brother has 
(non alia bibam / mercede 1.27.13–14), we recognize that he intends to put a 
temporary halt to his celebratory mood while he tries to bring his companions to 
order. In other cases, a present attitude is projected into the future; the future 
tense of vetabo at 3.2.26, in the context of the declaration that the man who 
publishes the mysteries of Ceres will be unwelcome under the speaker’s roof 
(vetabo, qui Cereris sacrum / volgarit arcanae, sub isdem / sit trabibus 26–8), merely 
underlines emphatically a strongly held belief, true now and forever. 
It would be misleading, however, to suggest that a voluntative future is exactly 
equivalent to a direct command; indeed, commentators often hint that the 
former adds an element of urbanity and politesse.30 This is because the speaker in 
                                                                                                     
tense interacts with and qualifies the present. 
29 Cf. Weiss (2009) 414–15 and the concise formulation of Clackson and Horrocks (2007) 23: 
“The old PIE subjunctive becomes the Latin future, the old PIE optative becomes the Latin 
subjunctive.” Cf. also Palmer (1954) 271. 
30 Stotlz and Schmalz (1900) 238 explain: “Jedoch wird der Indikativ des Futurs niemals zum 
Ausdruck eines eigentlichen Befehls gebraucht; dazu dient der Imperativ. Wohl aber spricht 
derjenige eine Aufforderung im Fut. Ind. aus, welcher sich fein (urban) ausdrücken oder andeuten 
will, dass er auf die Ausführung sicher rechnet.” Thus Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) 204 term it a 
“polite imperative.” Gildersleeve and Lodge (1895) 162, on the other hand, associate this sense of 
the future with “familiar language,” possibly following Kühner (1878) 110. Cf. also Palmer (1954) 
307.  
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such instances technically omits the command itself—which under certain 
circumstances might be deemed presumptuous—and, looking toward some 
future time, politely presumes that the desired outcome may be relied upon. After 
the speaker of 2.1.9–12, for instance, begs that Pollio not abandon the writing of 
tragedy for too long (paulum severae musa tragoediae / desit theatris 2.1.9–10), he 
proceeds to say “you will resume your noble task” (grande munus / repetes), 
passing over a direct request that Pollio return to the theater, but decorously 
expecting that such a return is imminent. 
The careful and mannered sophistication of this usage suits a poem addressed 
to a celebrated public figure. But the tactic is apt for other situations as well. At 
1.16.3, for instance, as the speaker prepares to renounce the angry iambic poetry 
of his youth, he uses the future pones “you will put” to suggest politely that his 
former victim do with these violent poems whatever she may wish; the avoidance 
of a direct command fits his new friendly tone quite elegantly (nunc ego mitibus / 
mutare quaero tristia 25–6). So too the speaker proceeds gently with Licinius in 
2.10, employing the futures vives “you will live” (rectius vives, Licini 1) and contrahes 
“you will draw in” (contrahes vento nimium secundo / turgida vela 23–4) under the 
tactful presumption that his addressee will inevitably take his good advice; 
meanwhile he speaks metaphorically about the risks Licinius has already run.31 
Likewise, when the speaker at 2.12.10 defers to Maecenas the task of celebrating 
the wars of Augustus, he uses the future dices “you will say,” lest he appear to reject 
the commission in a preemptory and high-handed fashion. 
The so-called “futures of invitation” would also fall into this category, and they 
too make gentle, urbane and sometimes implicit suggestions rather than insistent 
demands. When the speaker of 1.17 says to Tyndaris “here in the secluded valley 
you will avoid the heat of the Dog-star” (17–18), an invitation to leave Rome and 
come to the country is understood, but the command itself is tactfully 
suppressed; Tyndaris has another lover, after all. So also with potabis “you will 
drink” of 1.20.1, the speaker is thought to invite Maecenas to enjoy his Sabine 
wine, but the suggestion is so modest and discreet that the particulars of the 
dramatic situation are much disputed. The spirit of invitation is projected into 
 
31 If Licinius is actually A. Terentius Varro Licinius Murena (cf. Kiessling and Heinze (1955) 
202; Syme (1939) 325 n. 5; Nisbet and Hubbard (1978) 152–7), then both the immediate 
relevance of the advice and its studied vagueness are easily intelligible; this Licinius, brother-in-law 
of Maecenas by adoption and consular colleague of Augustus in 23 BC, was executed the following 
year for his alleged role in the conspiracy of Fannius Caepio. But the chronology of events presents 
significant challenges and the identification is disputed by Lyne (1995) 69 n. 8. 
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the indefinite future, at a time unspecified. 32 Maecenas is under no direct 
obligation to accept or decline. 
Present imperatives and jussive subjunctives may be, as we have seen, 
understood to enforce presence rather than look to the future. If the voluntative 
future is viewed as a mere substitute for such unmediated directives, its tense may 
seem irrelevant. In fact, tense is often critical, especially for the second and third 
person futures just discussed: it is precisely the future’s deferral of immediate 
obligation that adds sophistication and polite indirection to commands and 
exhortations. The expectation that the desired action or event will eventually 
come to pass—if not immediately, then at some appropriate future time—
renders a clear request unnecessary and impolitic. By looking toward the 
moment when a desire will be satisfied, such futures draw attention away from 
the present, accentuating a temporal orientation already inherent in other 
directive expressions. 
Clearly and self-evidently voluntative futures comprise approximately one fifth 
of all instances of the future tense in Odes 1–3. In the remainder of cases, the 
future is less an expression of the speaker’s desire or intention and more an 
ineluctable fact, which will necessarily either continue or depart from some 
present state of affairs (cf. Appendix 1B below). There is no bright line between 
voluntative and factual futures: a factual future may hint obliquely at a desire, just 
as a voluntative future may rely upon its temporality to soften a directive 
expression. Nonetheless, a difference in emphasis is often evident, especially 
when a verb in the future tense presents a prediction or a prophecy. Nereus is 
basically indifferent and objective in 1.15, when he foretells Paris’ fate using eight 
verbs in the future tense (repetet … pectes … divides … vitabis … nosces… fugies 
… proferet … uret); likewise, when the speaker of an ode is bemoaning 
deplorable but unavoidable destiny, as the speaker in 2.3 and 2.14 laments the 
inexorable approach of death, numerous future verbs detail the undesired but 
inevitably gathering gloom (cedes coemptis saltibus et domo / villaque flavos quam 
Tiberis lavit, / cedes et exstructis in altum / divitiis potietur heres, 2.3.17–20; nec pietas 
moram / rugis et instanti senectae / adferet … erimus … carebimus … metuemus …  
sequetur … absumet … tinget, 2.14.2–4, 12, 13, 16, 24, 25, 27).  
Sometimes a prophetic future is contrasted with a verb of another tense. Thus 
in 1.2 the speaker “has seen” portents (vidimus 13) but the next generation “will 
 
32 This is naturally uncharacteristic of an actual invitation, poetic or prosaic. Edmunds (1982) 
184–5 considers neither 1.17 nor 1.20 a true “invitation-poem,” since both fail to specify a time. 
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hear” (audiet 21); thus at 1.4.19–20 young men currently “burn” (calet) for 
Lycidas but young women will soon grow warm (tepebunt). Thus also at 1.7.19–
20 the camp “holds” (tenent) Plancus, but Tibur “will hold” him (tenebit), 
allowing us to understand, it is generally supposed, that Plancus is abroad.33 
Likewise in 1.20, Maecenas “will drink” (bibes 10) expensive vintages, but such 
appellations do not “make mild” (temperant 11) the speaker’s cups: thus Heinze 
asserts that Maecenas is at the speaker’s house.34 Such contrasting futures are, in 
one sense, natural companions of Davis’ “CD [carpe diem] philosophy;” death, 
inevitable and ineluctable, awaits but remains temporarily distant, providing all 
the more reason not to let the present moment pass without enjoyment. In the 
celebrated cases of 1.4 and 2.14, sympotic poems where the speaker makes no 
explicit request of the addressee, futures in monitory statements such as “soon 
night will press around you” (iam te premet nox 1.4.16) and “your heir will 
consume the Caecuban” (absumet heres Caecuba 2.14.25) are thought to have 
“illocutionary force,” that is, to suggest that the host offer more generously from 
his stores of wine.35 This understated mode of expression expands upon the 
mannered subtlety previously observed in the voluntative future; veiled 
suggestion and uncertain implication are often preferable to the direct 
imposition of will.  
A future verb may also generalize or indicate the continuance of a present state 
of affairs into a future time. Amabo (“I will love”) of 1.22.22, for instance, asserts 
that the speaker will continue to love Lalage regardless of time or place. The 
contrast here is not between two different actions, but between two times and 
places, with the continuance of the speaker’s love in the extreme conditions of the 
 
33 Moles (2002) 90, for instance, a recent exponent of this traditional interpretation, sets the 
poem in a symposium on the eve of Plancus’ desertion of Antony in 32, just before Plancus 
returned to Rome. Eminent dissenters who argue that the poem’s setting is in fact Tibur include 
Syme (1963) 511, Quinn (1980) 135 and Lyne (1995) 84. 
34 Nisbet and Hubbard, Kiessling and Heinze, Quinn et al. take bibes to mean “you will drink (at 
your house, but not at mine).” This does seem the most plausible interpretation, although if potabis 
in line 1 is taken to mean the opposite, i.e. “you will drink (at my house),” the change in supposed 
location falls rather heavily on the emphatic tu. Emendations to the subjunctive have been 
suggested (liques [Krüger, Müller], bibas [Keller]) or to the present indicative: bibis (a reading of the 
Cod. Voss. et alii, according to Peerlkamp, but unmetrical), vides (Eckstein, Munro), moves 
(Bücheler), liquas (Delz). 
35 Cf. Davis (1991) 160–1: “…in the context of CD [i.e. carpe diem] poetry it is often the case 
that declarative sentences, especially when projected into the future, have the illocutionary force of 
exhortations.” 
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hypothetical future representing the depth of his present affection. The “gnomic” 
future has much the same nuance: futurity here gives a statement the sanction of 
eternity, strengthening a present truth by mirroring it in a contrasting time. Thus 
we are told at 3.1.17–21 that for the man over whom the sword of Damocles “will 
hang” (pendet), Sicilian feasts “will not elaborate” (elaborabunt) sweet taste, and 
music “will not bring back” (reducent) sleep. The future situation is hypothetical, 
but it illustrates an ever-present truth. 
Different but to a certain degree coextensive is the use of the future in 
questions and conditions, where the speaker may not illustrate a present truth or 
confidently predict an outcome, but rather seems to contemplate a possible event 
and perhaps its likely consequence. Orthodox Latin grammar dictates that a 
condition with a future in the apodosis should have a coordinating future or 
future perfect in the protasis, rather than the anticipatory present common in 
English.36 The temporality of the Latin usage may indeed seem unnecessarily 
precise to the English ear. So at 2.14.11–12, the waters of the Styx must be 
crossed, “whether we will be kings or poor farmers” (enaviganda sive reges / sive 
inopes erimus coloni); the tense of erimus in the protasis is drawn to the futurity of 
the gerundive in the apodosis. But a future even in a condition usually makes a 
distinct point. Although our wealth and social station are relevant at the time of 
speaking, they will be all the more affecting at the future moment when we are 
poised to lose our possessions in death. The just man described at 3.3.1–8 is 
unshakeable: “if the shattered world should fall upon him, the ruins will strike 
him unafraid” (si fractus illabatur orbis / impavidum ferient ruinae 3.3.7–8). The 
ruin of the world is an unlikely supposition; the just man’s fearlessness is a 
certainty.37 In other cases, the speaker wonders aloud, often rhetorically, whether 
or how some expectation will be fulfilled. In 1.2, a disastrous flood threatens 
Rome: whom will Jupiter choose as a savior? (cui dabit partis scelus expiandi / 
Iuppiter? 1.2.29–30). Such futures are not really prophetic—they are not always 
sure of the outcome—nor do they invariably generalize or expect the present to 
continue—the situation they contemplate may be quite specific or extraordinary. 
They tend to look toward the future with more uncertainty than confidence. 
 
36 The classical preference for conditions with a future in both clauses (cf. Stolz and Schmalz 
(1900) 412) probably secures the future inseres at 1.1.35 as well as quaeret at 3.24.26, but the 
variants inseris and quaerit, which occur in a number of manuscripts, hint that this is hardly an 
ironclad rule; Horace also employs present-future conditions, as at Odes 4.1.9–12 (tempestivius in 
domum / Pauli purpureis ales oloribus / comissabere Maximi, / si torrere iecur quaeris idoneum). 
37 Cf. Nisbet and Rudd (2007) 40. 
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Futures that disguise imperatives, those that prophesy and those that illustrate 
a continuing or eternal truth may all be understood as foils, as mirrors set against 
some notional present but positioned to reflect light back upon it. The action of 
these verbs does not, of course, take place in the hic et nunc, but perhaps their 
futurity merely balances out one side of the “pivot” of which Lowrie speaks, an 
illustration of the inside by the illumination of the outside. The darker the 
shadow of death, so the argument goes, the sharper our appreciation of life. This 
is a tidy theory, but it has the same shortcomings as Heinze’s definition of the 
Horatian ode: it requires that the reader read a basic premise into poems where 
that premise is not self-evident.38 Of course the future does often serve to 
emphasize the present, as Davis and others effectively show, but it hardly follows 
that the tense must invariably perform only this function. The sheer 
preponderance of futures throughout Odes 1–3 broadly suggests an alternative 
interpretation: that the attention of both the reader and the poet may be 
surreptitiously drawn away from the present by a powerful and countervailing 
temporal force. 
The supposition that futurity may in fact question and destabilize the present is 
confirmed by a close analysis of individual instances. There are numerous verbs 
in the future tense through which the speaker’s attention shifts emphatically from 
a constructed present to some expectation as yet unfulfilled, which the poem is 
consigned merely to await. Many voluntative and monitory futures, as we have 
shown, seem calculated to defer rather than seize upon, or obscure rather than 
accentuate, some present obligation or concern. Futures in conditions or 
questions sometimes take this a step further: they may openly ponder, as in a 
dream, what events and consequences are possible in the time to come. It is often 
desirable for a poem to delay or postpone certain focal events; indeed, the 
 
38 Davis (1991), for instance, makes a similar argument in regard to the convivial odes, 
proceeding by a number of steps. He first posits that “Horatian lyric discourse typically ‘argues’ a 
coherent nexus of ideas through nuanced variations in form and presentation” (3); this includes a 
“rhetorical schema” for the “carpe diem ode” (45). The components of this schema not found in 
individual convivial poems may be understood to pertain even though left implicit, because the 
poet in these cases relies on “the reader’s prior awareness of the CD structure” (145). The 
culmination of the schema is a “prescription” such as rapiamus, amici / occasionem de die (Epod. 
13.3–4). Contrary elements are foils for this central argument. “The sympotic gesture that crowns 
that structure is counterpoised to the ineluctable circumstance of human mortality…the presence 
of death, as a recurrent motif, in the very bosom of the Horatian convivium is not indicative…of a 
gloomy disposition…but, on the contrary, of an intense recommitment to the joys of the present” 
(147–8). 
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speaker may, through strategic employment of the future tense, anticipate poetic 
acts and aesthetic decisions (a Pindaric usage), moderate or evade praise of great 
men, especially Augustus, or even add urgency and suspense to sympotic 
poems—the very odes thought to be paradigmatic of Horace’s “poetics of 
presence.”39 
Consider, first of all, the mystifying and much disputed future tense of inseres 
(“you will insert”), which figures prominently in the epilogue to Odes 1.1. The 
future here is generally understood to postpone the judgment of the quality of 
the Odes until the whole collection may be read: neither Maecenas nor any other 
reader will render such a decision until this indefinite future time.40 The idea is 
expressed concisely and cleverly, and, as Sutherland has pointed out, implicates 
the reader in the same breath as Maecenas; it also expands the time of reading to 
encompass an extra-poetical future, embracing not just this poem but the whole 
collection, and the actions and judgments of all readers yet to come.41 Instead of 
projecting himself into the “iterative” present of the abstract reader, as Ovid does, 
for instance, Horace pushes the valorizing moment of judgment into the 
uncertain future.42 
This challenging concept has unsettled enough readers of Horace to raise the 
specter of a textual controversy. The present inseris appears in a significant 
minority of manuscripts, and scholars such as Peerlkamp, Hermann and now 
Shackleton Bailey have suggested various solutions and simplifications.43 Yet 
 
39 I have collected all such instances in Appendix II, marking each according their previous 
categorization as factual or voluntative. 
40 Cf. Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) 15: “Here he pretends that Maecenas has still to read the 
collection.”  
41 This possible broader meaning of inseres is expressed differently by different scholars. Pomeroy 
(1980) 37 states “the wish expressed by inseres is no longer confined to the stated addressee, but can 
be taken as the ideal second person singular of the future.” Gold (1992) 176 argues that the subject 
of inseres could be “the Muses and the gods referred to in the previous lines and posterity;” 
Sutherland (2002) 31 thinks the reader may become “assimilated to the ode’s addressee, who is 
implied in the second-singular form of inseres.” Kovacs (2010) 308–9 argues that the subject of 
inseres is an “indefinite second person.” 
42 Cf. Ovid, Tr. 4.10.131–32, which is focalized from the reader’s perspective: sive favore tuli, sive 
hanc ego carmine famam, / iure tibi grates, candide lector, ago. (“Whether I earned this fame by favor or 
by song, I give thanks, rightly, to you, fair reader.”) 
43 Peerlkamp (1834) 8 reads the variant inseris, but obelizes the whole of line 36, on the grounds 
that Horace would not brag about what he has not yet accomplished: sed hoc statim, initio rei 
susceptae, de se praedicare, est hominis superbi. Hermann (1877) 395–404 argues for the excision of 
the first two and last two lines. Shackleton Bailey (2001) 2 thinks that the text of lines 32–6 is 
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there are other cases in which the speaker anticipates some future song of praise 
or contemplates, as he sings, what the subject of his song will be. The litany of 
futures in 1.12 portrays a song of praise as imminent when it is manifestly on-
going; in 3.25 dicam (“I will say” 7) and loquar (“I will speak” 18) likewise 
anticipate a remarkable poem rather than acknowledge that such a poem has 
already begun.44 
In a few instances, the poet uses the future tense to postpone his most 
extravagant praise of Augustus: in 1.2, for example, dabit (“will give” 29) suggests 
that Jupiter has not yet chosen a savior of Rome, even though the final stanzas 
imply that such a savior is already at hand. In 3.3 (Iustum et tenacem) Augustus 
“will drink” (bibet 12) nectar among the gods—although he was implied to be a 
god in human form at 1.2.41–52—and in 3.5 the emperor “will be considered” 
(habebitur 2) a god on earth, but only after he subdues the Britons and the 
Persians. In 3.24, an anonymous savior—whoever “will wish” (volet 25) to end 
civil unrest—is implored to be bold enough to rein in untamed license, if he “will 
seek” (quaeret 27) that the title pater be inscribed on statues45—as if Augustus 
has not yet taken up the issue of civil strife or sought recognition.46 The future 
                                                                                                     
corrupt, although he does not actually print any changes to the received text (text. recept. quem pro 
corrupto habeo, tamen reliqui); his suggestion, taken from Bergk, proposes to punctuate after 
secernunt populo and start a new sentence as follows (changes underlined): si neque tibias/ Euterpe 
cohibet nec Polyhymnia/ Lesbois refugit tendere barbiton/ chordis, me lyricis vatibus inserens/ sublimi 
feriam sidera vertice. The reason for the disappearance of the second person (given in Shackleton 
Bailey (1985) 153) is that the approval of Maecenas (i.e. the “you” of inseres) ought not to take 
precedence over the approval of the Muse. 
44 The usage has a parallel in Pindar, who often uses a first person future to announce a song and 
to create the fictional impression that it is being composed on the spot, as Pfeijffer (1999) 33–43 
shows; in O. 2.2–6, the inspiration for Odes 1.12.1–3, Pindar immediately answers the question 
posed by the “fictive” future κελαδήσομεν (ἀναξιφόρμιγγες ὕμνοι, / τίνα θεόν, τίν᾽ ἥρωα, τίνα δ᾽ 
ἄνδρα κελαδήσομεν; / ἤτοι Πίσα μὲν Διός: / Ὀλυμπιάδα δ᾽ ἔστασεν Ἡρακλέης / ἀκρόθινα πολέμου· 
/ Θήρωνα δὲ… (“Hymns, lords of the lyre, what god, what hero, and what man shall we celebrate? 
Surely Pisa belongs to Zeus, and Heracles founded the Olympic games as spoils from war; and 
Theron …”)). Horace, conversely, maintains the sense of anticipation and futurity until the very 
end in order to defer direct address and unambiguous praise of Augustus. 
45 What exactly is to be inscribed on the statues is contested; cf. Kiessling and Heinze (1955) 
354 and Nisbet and Rudd (2004) 283. But is unlikely to be pater urbium: pater is normally 
constructed with the singular urbis (Ov. Fast. 3.72; Man. 4.718; Stat. Silv. 1.4.95, 4.8.20; Juv. 2.126; 
cf. Woodman and Martin (1996) 228 n. 1) and this formulation is universal enough that the Greek 
equivalent πατὴρ τῆς πόλεως is well attested in the inscriptions of late antique Asia Minor. Cf. 
Roueché (1979). 
46 Cf. Nisbet and Rudd (2004) 282: “the future volet avoids the suggestion that the issue [of civil 
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functions ably as an adjunct to discretion both in recusatio and panegyric; 
promises (‘I shall sing later’), concessions (‘someone else will sing’) and 
conditions (‘I shall sing if ...’) all lessen the injury of refusal. So too does this same 
deference and delay play a critical role in sympotic poems. Here the future tense 
often serves to underline the characteristic and powerful mode of aspiration, 
questioning the transcendence of the present moment and conveying anxiety 
about the relentless passage of time. 
In 2.5.9–10, the speaker advises an anxious lover to delay the gratification of 
his desire (tolle cupidinem / inmitis uvae “put an end to desire for the unripe 
grape”), a sentiment which contrasts sharply with insistent erotic overtures in this 
and other poems.47 Such an approach to pleasure more broadly understood, 
however, is not unparalleled in Horace’s sympotic poetry; verbs in the future 
tense also occasionally locate gratification outside of the poem, even when this 
postponement seems at odds with the dramatic setting of the symposium. 
Consider the final two stanzas of 2.7, which unfold after the speaker has 
welcomed his friend Pompeius home from war and proposed a feast (21–8):  
 
Oblivioso levia Massico 
ciboria exple, funde capacibus 
  unguenta de conchis. quis udo 
    deproperare apio coronas 
 
curatve myrto? quem Venus arbitrum 
dicet bibendi? non ego sanius 
  bacchabor Edonis. recepto 
    dulce mihi furere est amico. 
 
Fill full smooth vessels with a Massic full of forgetfulness, pour out 
unguents from voluminous shells. Whose concern is it to make 
hastily garlands of damp wild celery or myrtle? Whom will Venus 
name the arbiter of drinking? I will not revel more soberly than the 
Thracians. It is sweet for me to rage madly when I get back a friend.  
 
The imperatives exple and funde order directly that preparations be made; the 
present curat inquires after the distribution of responsibilities. If the former imply 
that preparations are underway, the latter suggests anxiety that they are not 
                                                                                                     
strife] is a current one.” On the future of quaeret, cf. n. 36 above. The whole stanza is studiously 
vague: cf. Fraenkel (1957) 242; Williams (1969) 127; Quinn (1980) 284; Oliensis (1998) 128. 
47 E.g. Odes 1.23.11–12: tandem desine matrem / tempestiva sequi viro. (“cease at last to follow your 
mother, when you are ready for a man.”) 
 PRESENCE IN HORACE’S ODES 351 
proceeding quickly enough. The futures dicet and bacchabor, therefore, find the 
speaker anticipating the moment of celebration—not far off, but not yet at 
hand—as if it were a pleasant daydream. A similar transition from present to 
future is evident in 2.11, where the speaker proposes an impromptu celebration 
(13–22): 
 
cur non sub alta vel platano vel hac 
pinu iacentes sic temere et rosa 
  canos odorati capillos, 
     dum licet, Assyriaque nardo 
 
potamus uncti? dissipat Euhius 
curas edacis. quis puer ocius 
  restinguet ardentis Falerni 
    pocula praetereunte lympha? 
  
quis devium scortum eliciet domo 
Lyden? 
 
Why do we not drink lying thus without further ado either under the 
tall plane tree or this pine, white hair perfumed with the rose, while it 
is allowed, and anointed with Assyrian nard? The wine god scatters 
gnawing cares. Which boy will quench swifter the cups of burning 
Falernian with the water passing by? Who will lure forth Lyde, that 
whore in hiding, from her home?  
 
The speaker begins the poem in the present, with regret that a political 
discussion has distracted from a potential drinking bout: why delay, when the 
salutary effects of wine are available now? Then thoughts turn to the immediate 
future; which slave will mix the wine faster? The next sentence finds the speaker 
plunging deeper into a reverie of impending frivolity: who will be able to lure 
Lyde out of hiding? The poem concludes with a wistful description, couched in 
an order, of Lyde coming forth with her ivory lyre, hair neatly bound up in the 
Laconian manner. The sympotic consolation is not, in fact, immediately 
accessible: preparations must first be made, and burgeoning desire for the 
moment deferred. 
There are further examples of this ambiguous temporality. The speaker of 3.8 
is surprised by Maecenas in the midst of his preparations for the Matronalia but, 
in a shift of temporal emphasis, the celebration itself is merely anticipated (9–
12):  
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hic dies anno redeunte festus 
corticem adstrictum pice dimovebit 
amphorae fumum bibere institutae 
  consule Tullo. 
 
This holiday, as the year returns to it, will remove the pitch-smeared 
cork of a wine-jar that first began to drink in the smoke in the 
consulship of Tullus. 
 
For the moment the amphora remains corked, within reach, perhaps, but as yet 
untouched. In 3.14, the speaker declares that the day of Augustus’ arrival from 
Spain “will drive away” (exiget 14) dark thoughts and that he “will not fear” 
(metuam 15) a violent death—but this moment of clarity is only anticipated, not 
yet experienced. Most emphatic of all are Odes 3.13 and 3.17, which explicitly 
procrastinate, putting off until the next day an absolutely focal event—in the first 
instance a sacrifice, in the second a party for which the speaker enjoins Aelius 
Lamia to prepare. 
Davis is not without an answer for this particular problem. He writes of 3.17: 
“the lyrist has not, we may safely assume, relinquished his cherished view that the 
present, rather than the future, should be the dominant focus of human concern. 
On the contrary, the concrete response that he urges—the piling on of 
firewood—is indeed to be implemented at once, for both storm and antidotal 
banquet are imminent.”48 The immediate future may on this view be treated as 
synonymous with the present. A dogma of Bundy is sometimes cited for the same 
purpose, that is, in order to remove the nagging temporality of a verb in the future 
tense. Bundy writes, in reference to the future κελαδήσω at Olympian 11.14, that 
the first person future indicative in Pindar “never points beyond the ode itself, 
and its promise is often fulfilled by the mere pronunciation of the word.”49  
But just as this idea has now been carefully examined and refuted by Pfeijffer, 
who concludes that no first person future in Pindar can be separated from its 
tense without a loss of meaning50—so too we would do well to wonder if it is 
 
48 Davis (1991) 154. 
49 Bundy (1969) 21; cf. also Faraone (1995), who finds similar futures in Greek magical texts 
and in Theocritus’ second Idyll. Nisbet and Rudd (2004) 298 cite Bundy in order to elucidate 
audiar at 3.25.4. 
50 Pfeijffer (1999) 67. He divides all first person futures in Pindar into two categories: I) those 
referring to some point in the poem or the poem itself and II) those referring to a general thought 
or some point beyond the poem. With the exception of generalizing or gnomic futures, Pindar’s 
first person futures generally convey the speaker’s intentions and so would usually fall into our first 
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really Horace’s goal to focus so exclusively on the present, or whether he might 
have something more subtle in mind. The imperative, after all, is already poised 
between the two tenses: it both expects the attentive presence of the addressee 
and points to an event not yet occurred, a wish not yet fulfilled. The use of the 
future to illustrate the present by contrast is subject to a similar interpretation: 
even as these verbs draw attention to the present, they undermine its singularity 
and transcendence, illustrating the impossibility of extricating the present 
moment from time yet to come. The futures that defer aesthetic decisions, delay 
excessive panegyric, and postpone sympotic acts merely deploy lyric’s familiar 
mode of aspiration to sharpen anticipation or soften disappointment. In some 
cases, as in 3.13 and 3.17, the poet accedes entirely to the allure of anticipation, 
putting off the symposium itself.  
In fact, what these last two remarkable poems make inescapably evident is the 
overwhelming tendency of the sympotic odes to be situated at a moment of 
transition, exhorting or anticipating some climactic event, anxious that it will 
never come, that time is moving too quickly. And this anxiety over the all-too-
swift passage of time may even entertain the thought that there is no present 
moment as such, but only the future constantly and imperceptibly becoming the 
past.51 The expression carpe diem itself conveys much this same paradox: not 
seize the day, but rather endeavor to pluck some of time’s fruits or flowers as the 
whole grows, like a vine, forever out of reach.52 Bundy’s and Davis’ assimilation of 
troublesome futures to the present could therefore be turned around, in the 
manner of Derrida, and taken rather to undermine and question the present, to 
                                                                                                     
category of voluntative futures. Yet Pfeijffer takes pains to emphasize the importance of each verb’s 
temporality, an approach which is consonant with the conclusions of this study; cf. Pfeijffer (1999) 
14 n. 21. 
51 Traina (1973) 21 anticipates this idea by emphasizing the shadow always cast by the future on 
the present as well as the defensive and fearful posture assumed by the speaker of carpe diem: “Il 
presente oraziano, l’abbiamo visto, è sempre in rapporto antitetico con l’idea del futuro, come due 
facce della stessa medaglia: una fuga dal domani, che sull’oggi proietta un’ombra di 
morte…saggezza di difesa, e, in fondo, rinuncia: mitte sectari, rosa quo loquorum / sera morteur ...” 
52 So originally Porphyrio ad loc.: translatio autem a pomis sumpta est, quae scilicet ideo carpimus, ut 
fruamur. Cf. West (1967) 58–64, Traina (1973), Barchiesi (2007) 154; compare volucris dies, 
3.28.6, 4.13.16. In Horace, humans may either take some part from the day or the hour (rapiamus, 
amici, / occasionem de die (Epod. 13.3–4), partem solido demere de die (Odes 1.1.20)) or accept the 
gifts of time (dona praesentis cape laetus horae (Odes 3.8.27), tu quamcumque deus tibi fortunaverit 
horam / grata sume manu (Epist. 11.22–3)); as Traina (1973) 16 shows, the dies of carpe diem is to 
be plucked from the invida aetas of 1.11.7, which itself flees irresistibly away. 
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reveal its inadequacy.53 To understand the present deeply and truly is to 
understand that it is always anticipation, never actualization, always becoming, 
never being. It is but a vanishing moment of brilliance ever pursued and ever 
fading from that inexpressible horizon where the world of the poem meets the 
world of experience. 
Horace does on occasion produce a sympotic poem where presence in every 
sense plays a central role. Odes 1.27, for instance, clearly dramatizes an on-going 
scene and depicts the speaker reacting to events occurring around him. The 
evident confluence of temporal and spatial presence in the setting of this poem, 
however, is the exception that proves the rule. Thus the relentless emphasis in 
critical discourse on identifying and defining presence often obscures a crucial 
point: just as the poet rarely fixes “here” in space with absolute certainty, he 
seldom represents “now” in time as discrete, singular and preserved by the text 
itself. Far more often, the speaker suggests presence, orders it, exhorts it and 
implies that it is imminent, all the while pushing it just beyond the poem, 
dramatizing instead the anxiety of waiting, the difficulty of fully embracing the 
elusive moment and the inevitable weakness of will. A poem already 
mentioned—Odes 3.14—illustrates this fear of time’s continuity in a particularly 
elegant way. The speaker orders a celebration of Augustus’ arrival from Spain 
(prodeat 6, parcite 12); he expects that the day will drive away (exiget 14) his cares, 
nor will he fear strife and a violent death (nec tumultum / nec mori per vim metuam 
14–15). Before these orders and expectations are realized, however, the setting 
shifts to a private symposium anticipated through imperatives (i pete unguentum 
17, dic et…properet 21). The constitution of this event remains uncertain; the 
speaker asks a slave to summon clear-voiced Neaera, but will not incite an 
altercation if her doorman stands in the way. Move on (abito 24), he implores, 
aware that time is passing too quickly.54 The mode of anticipation flows 
irresistibly forward, bearing with it the flotsam of the past: the wine, elixir of 
forgetfulness, remembers the Social War (cadum Marsi memorem duelli 18) and 
the speaker, even as he awaits the dissipation of cares, reflects back upon the 
painful consulship of Plancus.55 The poem captures the drama and urgency of an 
 
53 Cf. n. 20 above. 
54 The future imperative abito appropriately keeps the focus on the hypothetical future. 
55 Cf. Fraenkel (1957) 290 and Oliensis (1998) 148–9: “But the wine for which Horace calls in 
Odes 3.14, stained as it is by both the Social War and the rising of Spartacus, seems peculiarly ill-
chosen…It is the day of Caesar’s return which will ‘banish black cares’…and Horace’s wine which 
brings care back into the picture.” Others, e.g. Syndikus (1973) 152, believe that the civil wars are 
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event that will never come, yet is forever becoming, forever inextricable from 
what has been. 
Futurity is an unavoidable quality of the Horatian ode: most odes, in one way 
or another, look hopefully or despondently toward the future. This prevailing 
attitude is in one sense a natural result of poetry that begs, prays, curses, advises or 
consoles, but the usage is also distinctly shaped by sophisticated ethical and 
aesthetic sensibilities. Futurity deepens the shadows of discretion and 
qualification that fall over much of Horace’s poetic discourse with the eminent 
men of his day, and especially over his praise of Augustus. A thrilling note of 
spontaneity and incompletion sounds when the speaker of an ode announces 
and anticipates a future song. Likewise, in the sympotic odes, a genre traditionally 
associated with immediacy of situation and setting, the speaker’s constant gaze 
toward the retreating horizon of time imparts a curiously vivid timelessness—
but through paradoxical means, through the problematization of presence, rather 
than presence itself. The speaker’s plight is, in other words, not unlike that of the 
lover on Keats’ Grecian urn (Ode on a Grecian Urn, 17-19): 
 
Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss  
Though winning near the goal—yet do not grieve  
She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss ... 
 
The symposium that is, like this kiss, forever unrealized also never perishes. That 
thought, however, is not without sorrow for the aspirant: Horace 
characteristically tempers expectation with the fear that the past is inescapable, 
the future forever retreating, the present impossible to embrace fully. If the poet 
gains thereby a measure of immortality, he does so not only by inscribing himself 
into the text, but also by joining his moment to that sempiternal stream of 
becoming which runs always toward the future—a future neither closer to nor 
further from the reader than the poet. 
 
DANIEL BARBER 






                                                                                                     
here remembered only to emphasize the present prosperity by contrast and to remind the reader 
that this prosperity depends on Augustus alone. For the identification of consule Planco with the year 
of Philippi, cf. Klingner (1965) 395–405. 
356 DANIEL BARBER 
 Appendix I: Uses of the Future Indicative in Odes 1–3:  
A. Voluntative Futures 
  
1. Announcing an intention or decision: 
Ode Future verb (line number) 
1.10 canam (5) 
1.12 dicam (13), silebo (21), dicam (25),referam (39) 
1.18 rapiam (13) 
1.26 tradam (2) 
1.27 bibam (13) 
2.7 bacchabor (27) 
2.17 feriemus (32) 
3.2 vetabo (26) 
3.3 redonabo (33) 
3.10 erit (19) 
3.11 feriam (43), tenebo (44) 
3.26 habebit (4) 
3.27 timebo (7) , suscitabo (8) 
 
2. Jussive or hortatory: 
Ode Future verb (line number) 
1.6 scriberis (1) 
1.7 ibimus (26), iterabimus (30) 
1.12 regnes (52) 
1.12 quaties (58), mittes (59) 
1.16 voles (2), pones (3) 
1.19 veniet (16) 
1.21 aget (16) 
2.1 repetes (12) 
2.2 regnes (9) 
2.6 sparges (23) 
2.10 vives (1), contrahes (23) 
2.12 dices (10) 
3.28 cantabimus (9), recines (11), dicetur (15) 
 
3. Concessive: 
Ode Future verb (line number) 
1.7 laudabunt (1), dicet (9) 
1.12 reget (56) 
1.20 bibes (10) 
 
4. Invitation 
Ode Future verb (line number) 
1.17 manabit (15), vitabis (18), dices (19), duces (22), confundet (23), metues (24) 
1.20 potabis (1) 
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 B. Factual Futures 
 
1.  Prophesying or making a prediction: 
Ode Future verb (line number) 
1.2 audiet (21) 
1.4 premet (16), sortiere (18), mirabere (19), tepebunt (20) 
1.5 flebit (7), emirabitur (8) 
1.13 solvet (20) 
1.14 referent (1) 
1.15 repetet (5), pectes (14), divides (15), vitabis (18), nosces (27),  
fugies (31), proferet (33), uret (35) 
1.25 flebis (10), saeviet (15) 
1.28 linquar (33), resolvent (34) 
1.36 deponent (18), divelletur (19) 
2.2 vivet (5),  aget (7) 
2.3 cedes (17), cedes (19), potietur (20) 
2.5 distinguet (11), sequetur (13), apponet (15), petet (16) 
2.10 erit (18) 
2.14 adferet (4), carebimus (13), metuemus (16), sequetur (24),  
absumet (25), tinget (27) 
2.15 relinquent (2), visentur (4), evincet (5), spargent (7), excludet (10) 
2.17 ducet (9), ibimus, ibimus (10), divellet (15) 
2.20 ferar (1), morabor (3), relinquam (5), obibo (7), cohibebor (8),  
visam (14), noscent (19), discet (20) 
3.3 bibet (12), iterabitur (62) 
3.5 habebitur (2) 
3.7 restituent (2) 
3.8 dimovebit (10) 
3.13 donaberis (3), inficiet, (5) fies (13) 
3.14 exiget (14), metuam (15) 
3.17 sternet (12), curabis (15) 
3.20 fugies (3) 
3.21 negleget (10), aderit (21), producent (23) 
3.23 sentiet (5), tinget (6)  
3.24 expedies (8) 
3.27 reddet (71), ducet (72) 
3.29 efficiet (46), diffinget (47), reddet (47) 
3.30 moriar (6), vitabit (7), crescam (8), dicar (10) 
 
 
2. Generalizing or continuing a present state of affairs into the future: 
Ode Future verb (line number) 
1.7 tenebit (20), ferret (25) 
1.9 dabit (14) 
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1.11 erit (3) 
1.22 amabo (22) 
1.27 poterit (22), expediet (24) 
1.28 minabitur (25), licebit (35) 
2.16 porriget (32) 
3.1 pendet (18), elaborabunt (19), reducent (21) 
3.4 eritis (29), temptabo (31), visam (33), visam (35), convenient (69) 
3.5 redibit (26), erit (32) 
3.6 lues (1) 
3.16 feret (22), porrigam (39) 
 
 
3. Contemplating a potential outcome: 
Ode Future verb (line number) 
1.1 inseres (35), feriam (36) 
1.2 dabit  (29) 
1.12 recinet (3) 
1.24 inveniet (8) 
1.29 serviet (6), statuetur (8), neget (10) 
1.33 iungentur  (8) 
2.11 restinguet  (19), eliciet (21) 
2.14 erimus  (12) 
3.3 ferient  (8) 
3.9 metuam  (11), parcent  (12), patiar  (15), parcent (16) 
3.14 fiet  (24) 
3.24 volet (25), quaeret (27) 
3.25 audiar  (4), dicam  (7), loquar (18) 
 
 Appendix II: Anticipatory Futures in Specific Contexts 
 
Anticipating an aesthetic decision or poetic act: 
Ode Future verb (line number) Location in Appendix I 
1.1 inseres (35), feriam (36) B3 
1.2 dabit (29) B3 
1.10 canam (5) A1 
1.12 recinet (3), dicam (13), silebo (21), dicam (25),  
referam (39) 
A1: 13, 21, 25, 39 
B3: 3 
3.4 convenient  (69) B2 
3.28 cantabimus (9), recines (11), dicetur (15) A2 
 
Anticipating praise of Augustus: 
Ode Future verb (line number) Location in Appendix I 
3.3 bibet (12) B1 
3.5 habebitur (2) B1 
3.24 volet (25), quaeret (27) B3 
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3.25 audiar  (4), dicam  (7), loquar (18) B3 
 
Anticipating sympotic acts and pleasures: 
Ode Future verb (line number) Location in Appendix I 
1.36 deponent (18), divelletur (19) B1 
2.7 bacchabor (27) A1 
2.11 restinguet  (19), eliciet (21) B3 
3.8 dimovebit (10) B1 
3.14 exiget (14), metuam (15) B1 
3.21 negleget (10), aderit (21), producent (23) B1 
 
Anticipating the celebration as a whole: 
Ode Future verb (line number) Location in Appendix I 
3.13 donaberis (3), inficiet, (5) fies (13) B1 
3.17 sternet (12), curabis (15) B1 
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